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Turnbull China Bikeride
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Turnbull China Bikeride - Disc 2.iso
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PGPhints
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PGP Signed Message
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1993-05-14
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13KB
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277 lines
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
PGPhints Version 2, 14-May-1993.
--------------------------------
There is a *lot* of documentation for PGP - here are a few hints and tips to
get you started with Archimedes PGP.
1) Most people install the PGP executable in their library directory
($.library), or somewhere else that they've defined to appear on their
Run$Path.
2) The filer *must* have seen the !PGP application before you try and use
PGP, so that the executable knows where keyrings and other important
files are kept.
3) If you have more than one filing system, you will have to take steps
to ensure PGP continues to work no matter what the current filing system
is. The simplest way is to redefine Run$Path from
,%.
to (say)
,adfs:%.
or, if you have library directories on each FS (presumably each having
different contents)
,adfs:%.,scsi:%.
no doubt some of you will have a Run$Path which is even more complex,
but the principle is the same.
Note that the `.' at the end of the above examples is a part of the
syntax, not a full stop.
4) If you don't want to have to type a fully-specified path to a file, set
the CSD to point to the directory containing that file and then run PGP.
5) The most useful command is PGP -h, which outputs the contents of pgp/hlp
to the screen.
6) If you run PGP in a task window, then you can turn off PGP's inbuilt
pager by adding the line
pager = "type"
to your config/txt.
7) PGP may be interrupted at any stage by pressing <Esc>.
8) PGP normally uses the !PGP folder for temporary files, but you can
choose to put them elsewhere (a faster hard disc, a slower hard disc
with more free space, or a RAM disc).
There are two ways of specifying an alternative placement for temporary
files. The first is to add a line like
TMP = "RAM:$"
to your config/txt.
However, this means that you always need the RAM disc present when you
use PGP. If want to use RAM disc for temporary files only when you're
encrypting a very large file, you can achieve this by SETting the OS
variable TMP to RAM:$, running PGP, then UNSETting TMP.
The OS variable TMP overrides any value specified in config/txt, so
you *can* have your cake and eat it.
9) Generate a secret key for yourself with PGP -kg. Most people go for a
1024-bit key. I would not recommend using a 384-bit key.
When PGP asks you to type some random text, I would advise that you
actually copy-type text from a randomly-selected book rather than
press keys at random - this should generate a wider spread of key-stroke
timings.
Note that generating a 1024-bit key takes around 3 minutes on an ARM3.
10) Your public key is likely to get passed around and end up on an
internet public-key server, so pick user-IDs that unambiguously
specify your address. It's no good saying that you're Fred Bloggs on
Dingbat BBS, make it clear that Dingbat BBS is a fido node and give its
fido address, e.g.,
Fred Xavier Bloggs (Fred Bloggs on Dingbat BBS. Fido 6:666/66.6)
Another reason fully specifying your user-ID is that people tend to use
PGP as an email address book.
11) If you have more than one address at which you're happy to receive
email, add user-IDs for each one. For instance, if you have an internet
address and use a BBS, you might add user-IDs like:
Fred Xavier Bloggs <fred.bloggs@foo.bar.com>
Fred Bloggs on Dingbat BBS. Fido 6:666/66.6
12) You can't change the text of user-IDs. What you must do instead is
add a new user-ID with PGP -ke, then remove the old one with PGP -kr.
Any signatures against the old ID will be lost when it is removed
(which is as it should be).
13) PGP currently has no way of revoking old user-IDs - even though you
remove it from your keyring, it will persist on other people's keyrings
because when they add the new version of your public key PGP merges any
new user-IDs with user-IDs already present.
The only solution I can think of is to add a new user-ID of the form:
Fred Bloggs on Dingbat BBS is no longer valid - please remove.
14) Some BBS sysops may not permit you to place encrypted mail or files on
their boards. Just because they have PGP in their file area, that
doesn't necessarily mean they tolerate you uploading encypted mail or
files - so *do* check first.
15) Fido netmail is even more sensitive. You should only send encrypted
netmail after checking that:
a) Your sysop permits it.
b) Your recipient's sysop permits it.
c) The netmail is sent direct, or arrangements have been made that
it will be routed through nodes whose sysops also permit it.
16) The most commonly used commands are:
PGP -kg generate a secret key for yourself
PGP -ka <file> add public key from file
PGP -kv <id> view public keys matching <id>
PGP -kxa <id> <file> extract public key for <id> to <file>
PGP <file> decrypt file and/or check signature
PGP -sta +clearsig=on <file> sign cleartext message
PGP -esa <file> <id> sign <file> and encrypt it to <id>
You don't have to type in a full user-id - PGP will look for keys which
contain the text given in <id>. For -kv and -kxa, PGP will return all
matching keys. For -esa, PGP will use the first matching key, so you
must enter enough text to unambiguously specify the desired recipient.
If someone has two different public keys, you can specify the numeric
key-ID (or part of it) by prefixing it with `0x'. E.g., to view key-IDs
matching 9876 use PGP -kv 0x9876.
If you have RISC OS 3, Peter Gaunt's PGPwimp provides a front end
which means you don't have to remember all those messy commands and
can either run pgp in a command window or a taskwindow (see the next
item for pitfalls in running PGP in a taskwindow).
17) When running PGP in a task window, key-presses sometimes appear to get
`lost' - this appears to be due to a bug in the C `txt' library routines
as other programs which use them also have this problem.
The `missing' characters have actually registered, it's just that the
window hasn't been updated correctly - pressing another key will cause
both it and the missing character to occur. Since this sometimes happens
when there is no more text to input (for instance when you press <Return>
after entering your pass-phrase), it is useful to know that pressing any
of the four cursor keys will cause the character to appear without
entering unwanted text.
During key generation, PGP displays a running count of the number of
remaining key-presses needed. From the command line the numbers appear
in the same position at the beginning of the line, but taskwindows
do not honour the backspace character so the output looks `messy' - you
may therefore prefer to generate keys from the command line.
18) It's *very* much easier to use PGP when it's integrated with your
mailer. If you use ReadNews for usenet news and mail, then you should
pick up a copy of RNscripts4PGP which add PGP functions to ReadNews.
ReadNews is designed to work with RUCP (an Archimedes version of UUCP),
so these scripts are currently only of use to users with UUCP
connections. Some BASIC programs are currently under development which
allow ReadNews to interoperate with ka9q for users with TCP/IP SLIP
connections.
19) BBS users probably use Reader (Archimedes BBS format only) or ReaderS
(multiple BBS formats - shareware). Currently there is no way of
integrating PGP with Reader(S). Decryption is just a matter of
extracting the relevant message and running PGP on it. Encryption is a
little messier:
a) Use your favourite editor to compose your message. If you're
replying to a message, extract it as a file (if it's encrypted
you'll then have to run PGP), and edit the extracted message to
add your reply. Save the edit session as a file.
b) Encrypt the file.
c) Tell Reader(S) to reply to the message, then drag your encrypted
reply into the Reader(s) reply window.
When dragging a signed or encrypted file to Reader(S), be careful that
it doesn't reformat it! The best way to make sure that reformatting
doesn't occur is to be careful not to insert or delete any text in
the reply window after dragging the file.
20) Be very careful with your secret keyring. Never be tempted to put a
copy in somebody else's machine so you can sign their public key - they
could have modified PGP to copy your secret key and grab your
passphrase.
21) Be careful with your public key. Exchange floppies rather than let
somebody copy it from floppy - that way they can't substitute a bogus
key on your floppy. At the very least, such a substition would be
embarassing. At worst, if your BBS's sysop is the one who substitutes
a bogus key, your email would be wide open.
22) Don't sign somebody else's key unless:
a) You're absolutely sure they're who they say they are.
b) You've exchanged keys face-to-face.
c) The email address given in the user-ID is valid (which you
check by signing and encypting email to them using the key they
gave you face-to-face, and they reply in a similar fashion).
23) Do try and exchange keys face-to-face whenever possible. Acorn
exhibitions are a very good way of meeting other Archimedes PGP users
from far and wide.
24) Don't sign X's key just because Y has also signed it. Your signature
is your word that you're certain the key is valid. If you're casual
about signing keys, people will not trust your signature.
25) PGP warns against trusting unsigned keys downloaded from BBSs. To some
extent this is true as the sysop could substitute a bogus key, intercept
mail, decrypt with the bogus key and re-encrypt with the correct key. Of
course, the sysop would have to arrange things so that whenever someone
downloaded their own key they got the real one, and signed files/public
messages would have to exist in two versions, but it's not impossible.
This does not mean that you can't use the key for routine email (where
you're using encryption as an `envelope' for your email) - it can never
be less secure than plaintext. However you should not use it for
`sensitive' information (but people exchanging `sensitive' information
would presumably exchange keys face-to-face first).
If you know the person whose key you have downloaded well enough to
recognise their voice, you can telephone them and ask them to read out
their key's `fingerprint' (obtained with PGP -kvc <id>). It is up to
you if you then choose to sign the key (I would not do so unless it was
somebody I knew *very* well).
26) Don't sign your sysop's key unless you've exchanged keys face-to-face.
I know you'd expect that downloading the sysop's key from a BBS ought
to be safe, but what if your friendly local government security agency
is filtering your comms through a Cray? For the same reason (and also
because some people are careless with their passwords), sysops should
not sign keys uploaded to their board by the key's owner without further
verifying them.
27) The more public keys you have in your collection, the greater the
chance PGP can find a certification chain stretching from you to your
intended recipient.
Revision History:
Version 1, 04-Apr-1993: Initial release.
Version 2, 14-May-1993: Added info on key-generation. Added item on
the problems of taskwindows. Added warning about taskwindows
to info on PGPwimp. Added info on ReadNews scripts for PGP.
Expanded info on Reader(S).
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----